As anyone who has ever tried a civil matter in Minnesota knows, the rules governing what claims are subject to jury determination and what claims are to be decided by the court are not always straightforward or clear. Article 1, Section 4 of the Minnesota Constitution provides for the right to a jury trial for all “cases at law,” which the Minnesota Supreme Court has interpreted to mean “ordinary common-law actions.” Hawley v. Wallace, 163 N.W. 127, 129 (Minn. 1917). On the other hand, the Court has also held that “[n]o right to a jury trial attaches to claims for equitable relief.” Onvoy, Inc. v. ALLETE, Inc. 736 N.W.2d 611, 615-16 (Minn. 2007). To complicate matters further, the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure permit district courts to try claims at law and claims for equitable relief in the same action. Minn. R. Civ. P. 18.01. In such situations, a district court may empanel an advisory jury on claims for equitable relief. Advisory jury decisions are just that—decisions by the jury as to solely equitable claims that are not binding, but instead “advisory” for the court. However, the rules also allow for the parties to “consent” to allow an advisory jury verdict to have “the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of right.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 39.02.
Given this complex array of possible scenarios, a question can arise as to whether and how the parties may agree to an advisory jury verdict that has “the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of right.” Does such consent need to be in writing? Must it be explicit, or can it be inferred by conduct or by silence? In Levy v. Daily Dental Care, LLC, No. A24-1194 (Minn. Ct. App. June 23, 2025), the Minnesota Court of Appeals issued a nonprecedential decision that provides important clarification on these issues, particularly as to whether the parties may implicitly consent to making an advisory jury verdict binding under Rule 39.02.
Background
In Levy the plaintiff, David Levy, provided consulting services to Daily Dental Care, LLC (DDC), a company producing oral-healthcare products. Although the parties negotiated terms for Levy’s services, including a proposed six-percent equity interest for Levy, no final consulting agreement was ever signed.
Following a breakdown in the relationship, Levy resigned and sued DDC and one of its founders for multiple claims, including breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and breach of implied contract. In his complaint Levy sought either specific performance of the equity grant or monetary damages.
Following service of the Complaint by Levy, DDC filed an initial civil cover sheet in which its counsel checked the box demanding a jury trial. However, the cover sheet never explicitly indicated whether DDC’s request was intended to include all claims, including equitable claims, or just those claims for which the right to a jury trial was automatic. After more than two years of pre-trial litigation, the case proceeded to an eight-day jury trial on Levy’s claims, including his claims for breach of contract and his equitable claim for promissory estoppel. The jury returned a verdict in Levy’s favor on the promissory estoppel and breach of implied contract claims, finding that Levy was entitled to a six-percent non-dilutable ownership interest in DDC under the equitable estoppel theory.
Post-Trial Reversal by the District Court
Despite having submitted the promissory estoppel claim to the jury, following post-trial motions the District Court held that the jury’s verdict on that claim was merely advisory, reasoning that since the promissory estoppel claim is equitable in nature it was not triable by jury as of right. The Court then substituted its own factual findings, reversed the jury’s verdict, and found in favor of DDC on the promissory estoppel claim. Levy appealed, arguing that the parties had effectively consented by their conduct to a binding jury trial on all claims, including promissory estoppel.
Court of Appeals Decision
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.
The appellate court held that although promissory estoppel is equitable in nature, the District Court erred in treating the jury’s findings as advisory. Specifically, the Court of Appeals found that the circumstances of the case, “viewed as a whole, demonstrate unequivocally that the parties consented to a binding jury trial on the promissory-estoppel claim.” The circumstances to which the court pointed were:
- DDC requested a jury trial in the civil cover sheet.
- Neither party requested bifurcation or an advisory jury before trial.
- DDC submitted a special verdict form addressing the promissory estoppel elements.
- The District Court instructed the jury that its role was to determine facts and apply the law.
- After trial, the District Court directed Levy to draft a proposed order as the “prevailing party.”
Certainly, an argument can be made that none of these facts viewed alone represented “unequivocal” consent by DDC to allow the jury decision on the promissory estoppel claim to be binding. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court’s post-verdict decision to disregard the jury’s findings was inconsistent with the record “as a whole” and constituted an abuse of discretion. As a result, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Levy based on the jury’s promissory estoppel findings.
Takeaways for Practitioners
As noted above, Levy is a nonprecedential decision, and it remains to be seen whether DDC will petition for further review with the Supreme Court. Regardless, the decision does serve as a reminder that explicit, written consent to submit an equitable claim to the jury may not be necessary to bind a party to a jury finding. Silence and conduct, such as jointly proposing jury instructions and verdict forms or failing to request bifurcation or an advisory jury before trial, may be sufficient to demonstrate consent. As such, before the commencement of the trial, and preferably well before the pre-trial conference, counsel should always take steps to make their position clear on whether they consent to making an advisory jury verdict binding under Rule 39.02. Otherwise, for better or worse, counsel may find that the jury verdict it thought was merely advisory is much more than that.
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